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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On 10 May 1977 Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, the newly ennobled General Editor of The 
Modern Law Review, wrote to John Griffith inviting him to give the 1978 Chorley Lecture. 
Noting that there had been no lecture on public law since its inauguration in 1972, 
Wedderburn expressed the Editorial Committee’s unanimous view that Griffith be invited to 
speak on some such aspect, adding that Otto Kahn-Freund was especially keen to have him 
speak on British developments under the title of ‘the living constitution’. Griffith responded 
in typical fashion. ‘I have tried to think of an excuse which would enable me, decently and 
graciously, to decline’, he wrote, ‘like an incommoding sickness which I expect to contract 
next spring, or my advanced years which must even now be encouraging the Great Reaper to 
spit on his scythe’. But he then, of course, courteously accepted. It would appear that he also 
agreed to give the lecture on ‘the living constitution’ because in the spring of 1978 a poster 
advertising it under this title was produced in proof. 1  
Once Griffith turned his attention to the substance of the lecture, however, he soon 
realised that this title would not do, and at a relatively late stage altered it to ‘The Political 
Constitution’. 2  This is not surprising; ‘the living constitution’ evokes an evolutionary 
metaphor which derives from Bagehot,3 and this hardly fitted Griffith’s method. Besides, he 
regarded Bagehot’s book as a fake, or as he puts it in the lecture an ‘unhappily misleading’ 
work.4 As a scholar much influenced by the methods of legal realism, Griffith sought to 
focus on facts and avoid metaphor. But in speaking figuratively he found greater clarity in 
mechanical rather than organic terminology. His amended title provides a significant clue to 
the thesis he intended to promote in the lecture. Converting constitutional ideas into political 
realities, his aim was to provide an appraisal of recent constitutional developments from the 
perspective of political science.  
 
 
 
II. THE THESIS OF THE LECTURE 
 
Griffith’s general approach to constitutional questions is made clear in the opening words of 
Dieter Grimm’s recently published essays on Constitutionalism. Grimm writes:   
 
Every political unit is constituted, but not every one of them has a constitution. The 
term ‘constitution’ covers both conditions, but the two are not the same. The term 
has two different meanings. Constitution in the first sense of the word refers to the 
nature of a country with reference to its political conditions. Constitution in the 
second sense refers to a law that concerns itself with the establishment and exercise 
of political rule. Consequently, the first definition refers to an empirical or 
descriptive constitution and the second a normative and prescriptive concept. Used 																																																								
1 This information is retrieved from the LSE Archive, Modern Law Review. ‘Chorley Lecture – Various, 1970-81’. Ref 
No: MLR/4/1. I am grateful to Dr Samuel Tschorne for his help in acquiring the material. 
2 The archive material includes a copy of the poster proof with this change in what recognisably is Griffith’s hand. 
3 Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution RHS Crossman ed. (London: Fontana, 1963), 267: ‘There is a great difficulty 
in the way of a writer who attempts to sketch a living Constitution – a Constitution that is in actual work and power.’ 
4 JAG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1-21, at 2. Subsequent page references in the text refer to 
this article. 
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empirically, constitution reflects the political conditions that in fact prevail in a 
specific region at a given time. In the normative sense, constitution establishes the 
rules by which political rule should be exercised under law.5  
 
Griffith would have accepted that account. He recognised that the British constitution is not 
a constitution in the normative sense; it is a descriptive concept that ‘reflects the political 
conditions that in fact prevail … at a given time’. His use of the term ‘political constitution’ 
signals his intention to present an appraisal of British constitutional arrangements by 
reference to ‘its political conditions’.   
In words that recall the terms of the MLR Committee’s invitation, Griffith begins the 
lecture by explaining why a balancing metaphor of ‘hold[ing] even the scales of 
constitutionalism’ is inappropriate (p.1). It is so, he says, because ‘conflict is at the heart of 
modern society’ and government is necessarily authoritarian (p.2). Coming of age in the 
1930s, Griffith adopted the sociological positivism of Comte, Durkheim and Duguit that was 
then influential in LSE circles. He aimed to free himself from ‘the tentacles of the natural 
lawyers, the metaphysicians and the illusionists’ who peddle fancy theories of constitutions 
and in its place he sought to discover ‘where the reality of political and economic power lay’ 
(pp.5-6). His is a thoroughly practical orientation that recognises the fact of social 
interdependence, focuses on the relationship between law and power, and treats 
constitutional law simply as an account of the law of public institutions (p.6). 
In the lecture he warns that this practical orientation is being displaced by the 
resurgence of natural law theories ‘advanced by both Conservatives and Liberals’ (p.7). Such 
theories, he explains, are implicit in the advocacy by Lords Hailsham and Scarman of the 
need for a new constitutional settlement (pp.7-10), the juristic underpinning of which can be 
found in Ronald Dworkin’s rights-based conception of law (pp.10-12).6 His objections are 
both political and philosophical. The political objection is that a rights-based method, 
especially once reinforced by ‘incorporat[ing] the European Convention into our domestic 
law’ (p.14), leaves political conflicts to be determined by the legal profession ‘as they embark 
on the happy and fruitful exercise of interpreting woolly principles and even woollier 
exceptions’ (p.14). The philosophical objection is that law is being ‘raised from its proper and 
useful function as a means to an end … to the level of a general concept’ (p.15).  
Griffith is especially critical of the ‘value of the exercise of telling judges or other 
legislators that they should look towards the ideals of justice, truth or beauty in their search 
for the right solution to difficult cases or problems’ and even more so of urging them ‘to 
look to the moral standard of the community’ because, he says, ‘I do not believe these things 
exist’ (p.12). His point is illustrated by reference to the idea of the ‘rule of law’. The term 
makes sense when it is taken to mean that there should be rules and machinery ‘for dealing 
with criminal offences and ensuring that public authorities do not exceed their legal powers’ 
but ‘when it is extended to mean more than that, it is a fantasy invented by Liberals of the 
old school in the late nineteenth century and patented by the Tories to throw a protective 
sanctity around certain legal and political institutions and principles which they wish to 
preserve at any cost’ (p.15). 
																																																								
5 Dieter Grimm, Constitutionalism: Past, Present, and Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 3. 
6 See, Lord Hailsham, The Dilemma of Democracy (Glasgow: Collins, 1977); Lord Scarman, English Law: The New Dimension 
(London: Stevens, 1974); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977). 
Dworkin responds directly to Griffith in his A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 
ch.1 ‘Political Judges and the Rule of Law’. 
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Griffith concludes the lecture by emphasising that ‘laws are merely statements of a 
power relationship’ (p.19), that ‘law is not and cannot be a substitute for politics’ and that 
‘political decisions should be taken … by people who are removable’ (p.16). The resurgence 
of natural law is dangerous because it involves an elitist trade in abstractions, because it leads 
to those holding political power being given ‘moral right or moral authority’, and because it 
mistakenly converts political claims into fundamental rights (pp.16-17). The constitution, he 
emphasises, is an empirical phenomenon; it ‘lives on, changing from day to day for the 
constitution is no more and no less than what happens’ (p.19). 
 
 
 
III. ORIGINALITY OF THE THESIS 
 
Since it is relatively well known, I have been concise in presenting the lecture’s basic thesis. 
What is less appreciated is its originality, and in this regard I want to make two claims.  
The first is that the lecture contains no new political, philosophical or methodological 
insights. It is both engaging and entertaining but, as his earliest scholarly publications show, 
Griffith used the Chorley Lecture to showcase arguments he had been consistently making 
over the previous thirty years. His work from the early 1950s on Parliament and legislation, 
for example, display a mature public law method already at work. We find him explaining 
that ‘the constitution is perpetually changing’ and that as ‘the nature of the constitution 
changes, the load of power shifts, and the functions of the various bodies change’.7 He also 
argues that because of this distinctive feature of the British constitution those who theorise 
about the constitution end up distorting it. ‘The theory of the constitution’, he maintains, ‘is 
full of ghosts striving to entangle us with their chains’.8 Because the constitution is ‘a flexible 
instrument’,9 and the ‘theory of the constitution is the rationalisation of events’,10 there is ‘a 
great danger of constitutional theory lagging far behind constitutional practice’. 11 
Constitutional analysis should never be undertaken from the vantage point of some idealised 
version but should focus on the way governing arrangements meet ‘the needs of the day’, 
that is, ‘by a functional not an a priori approach’.12  
The rigorous positivist and functionalist method that drives his argument in ‘The 
Political Constitution’ was fully formed by the early 1950s. According to this method, theory 
must never be permitted to distort understanding of ‘the “what actually happens” 
constitution’.13 We also see him asserting that law is not a norm: it is a social fact. Law is ‘a 
social science, part of the social order, dealing with private rights and public necessities and 
the conflicts between them’ and it is subject to evaluation only by showing that ‘the legal 
rules do not effect what they purpose’ or that they ‘work in such a way that the interests of 
certain individuals or groups (private and public) are advanced to the disadvantage of other 																																																								
7 JAG Griffith, ‘The Constitutional Significance of Delegated Legislation’ (1950) 48 Michigan Law Review 1079-1120, at 
1092.  
8 JAG Griffith, ‘The Place of Parliament in the Legislative Process: Part II’ (1951) 14 Modern Law Review 425-436, at 
436. 
9 JAG Griffith, ‘The Place of Parliament in the Legislative Process. Part I’ (1951) 14 Modern Law Review 279-96, at 279. 
10 Griffith, ‘The Constitutional Significance of Delegated Legislation’, above n.7, at 1118. 
11 Griffith, ‘The Place of Parliament in the Legislative Process. Part I’, above n.9, at 279. 
12 Ibid.  
13 JAG Griffith, ‘Justice and Administrative Law Revisited’ in JAG Griffith (ed), From policy to administration: essays in 
honour of William A. Robson (Allen & Unwin 1976), 200-16, at 204–5. 
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individuals or groups’. 14 And with respect to this second type of evaluative exercise, he 
emphasises that ‘I should clearly indicate my personal or philosophic presumptions and 
assumptions’.15  
This realist and functionalist method determines his well-known critique of the 
judiciary. He recognises that judges have an important technical role to perform but he also 
emphasises that they are human and as such have political views. As he wrote in the 1960s: 
‘They say and believe that distinctions can be made between matters apt for the courts, and 
matters apt for Parliament. They render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to 
themselves the things that are God’s – the ultimate values of justice, fair play, and holding 
the balance between the powers of the executive and individual rights, one of society’s more 
difficult conjuring tricks’.16 But in reality, he explains, they ‘embody, as they struggle to make 
finite decisions in finite situations, the sorts of contradictions which each of us lives in, 
placed, as we are, in political and personal situations which are structured, by our own nature 
and that of the societies we create, to reflect permanent and unavoidable conflicts’.17 
If my first claim is that his lecture contains no new political, philosophical or 
methodological insights, the second is that this is unsurprising since he was not the 
originator. Griffith was able to present this public law method fully formed in the early 1950s 
because he adopted a method that he neither invented nor developed. That Griffith 
presented this approach in such a confident and robust manner owes much to the fact that 
he belongs to the third generation of a functionalist style of public law promoted at the LSE 
in the first half of the twentieth century. His great achievement as a scholar is to have carried 
forward into the post-war period a method of public law pioneered by Harold Laski and 
then advanced by his disciples, William Robson and Ivor Jennings.  
Laski was the innovator and it is no coincidence that he spent his formative post-
graduate years between 1914 and 1920 in North America. There he fully embraced the 
innovative methods that we come to associate with American legal realism.18 Laski’s early 
work promoted a realist theory of the modern state. During the 1920s he provided the basic 
template for a modern approach to public law in Britain through studies on sovereignty, 
delegated legislation, administrative discretion and judicial review of social legislation.19 His 
functional method was then advanced by William Robson, who taught at LSE from 1926 
(the year Laski was promoted to the chair in political science) until his retirement in 1962, 
and Ivor Jennings, who joined in 1929 till 1940 (when he was appointed Vice-Chancellor of 
University College Ceylon).  
From the late-1920s onwards, Robson and Jennings produced a prodigious body of 
public law works on constitutional and administrative law, and especially on public 
corporations, tribunals, delegated legislation, judicial review, and local government. Griffith’s 
scholarly method was determined by the innovative work of his teachers - later senior 
colleagues - during the inter-war period. 20  In developing this functional method, these 																																																								
14 JAG Griffith, ‘Academic Preparation for the Practice of the Law’ (1962) 14 J. of Legal Education 13-20, at 18. 
15 Ibid. 19. 
16 JAG Griffith, ‘Judges in Politics: England’ (1968) 3 Government and Opposition 485-498, at 485. 
17 Ibid. 497. 
18 See Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), ch.2 
19 See Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 169-173. 
20 In the 1930s, for example, Jennings explicitly advocated the need for a new theory of law based not on the 
“philosophical method” but on the “sociological method”: W. Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (London: 
University of London Press, [1933] 2nd edn. 1938), Appendix III: ‘A Note on the Theory of Law’. As he mentions in 
the Chorley Lecture, Griffith was taught by Jennings as an undergraduate:  above n.4, 6. See also John Griffith, ‘A 
Pilgrim’s Progress’ (1995) 22 J. of Law and Society 410-15, 411: Jennings ... taught me to see the important distinction 
between definition and description, to see that definitions created greater problems than descriptions and that this was 
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scholars were influenced not just by a flourishing American legal realist movement but also 
by other modernising movements in European jurisprudence that promoted sociological, 
institutional and materialist approaches. 21  And although Griffith did not read much 
European theoretical literature - an obvious exception being Laski’s translation of Duguit’s 
work on the transformation of public law 22  - his views are not far removed from the 
institutionalism of Hauriou and Romano,23 the materialism of Lassalle and Mortati,24 and the 
nominalism of Schmitt.25 
 I emphasise these two points about Griffith’s thesis for a specific reason. His 1978 
Chorley Lecture was duly feted in the twenty-first century. But those who base their claims 
on the foundations of Griffith’s lecture generally fail to situate his arguments in an 
appropriate historical and political context.26 And if not properly situated, both meaning and 
significance are likely to be misconstrued. 
 
 
 
IV. THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION AS A PALIMPSEST 
 
In the two decades following Griffith’s Chorley Lecture, it was generally recognised as a 
critical assessment of contemporary constitutional ideas according to the functionalist 																																																																																																																																																														
particularly so when we had to unravel the confusions surrounding the doctrine of the separation of powers’.  Robson 
was also one of his tutors: see JAG Griffith, ‘Justice and Administrative Law Revisited’ in JAG Griffith (ed), From policy to 
administration: essays in honour of William A. Robson (Allen & Unwin 1976), 200-16, at 200: ‘I first sat at the master’s feet as 
an evacuee undergraduate in Cambridge [in 1939]’. He states there (at 204) that Robson ‘was breaking a long-standing 
British tradition which insisted on there being two levels of presentation. … On one level was advanced the view of 
the constitution handed down from Blackstone to Bagehot and Dicey. This consisted of a series of comfortable, 
liberal-democratic doctrines about the nature and functioning of the constitution … The other was that of day-to-day 
reality. This reality was not to be written about.’ See further Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory, above n.19, 165-
181.  
21 See W. Ivor Jennings (ed), Modern Theories of Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1933). See further, Martin 
Loughlin, ‘Modernism in British Public Law, 1919-79’ 2014 PL 56-67. 
22 See Griffith, ‘Political Constitution’, above n.4, at 6: ‘M. Duguit being a Frenchman and a constitutional lawyer 
seemed to me to present the nearest thing to a solid, positivist, unmetaphysical, non-natural foundation for analytical 
jurisprudence. I read him avidly. I wrote a long essay about him for my tutor Ivor Jennings who never returned it or, 
for all I know, read it.’ See Léon Duguit, Law in the Modern State F and H Laski trans (London: Allen & Unwin, 1921). 
23 Griffith, ‘A Pilgrim’s Progress’, above n.20, at 414: ‘Institutions are real, consisting not merely of the persons who 
form them. Like corporations (often the form they assume) they have their own existence, not only in legal theory but 
in the world.’ Further, at 413: ‘The founder of Institutional Theory was Maurice Hauriou who developed it in the early 
years of the century in his Précis de Droit Administratif and gave it prominence in an article in 1925, after which it became 
much discussed in France’. See Albert Broderick (ed), The French Institutionalists: Maurice Hauriou, Georges Renard, Joseph T. 
Delos (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), Pt.I; Santi Romano, The Legal Order [1917] Mariano Croce 
trans. (London: Routledge, 2017). 
24 JAG Griffith, ‘Judges and the Constitution’ in Richard Rawlings (ed), Law, Society, and Economy: Centenary Essays for the 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 1895-1995 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 288-310, 309: ‘The structure 
of the society we live in determines the shape of our institutions and the way they behave. That structure is both 
economic and political.’ Cf. Ferdinand Lassalle, ‘Über Verfassungswesen’ in his Gesamtwerke E. Blum ed. (Leipzig: Pfau, 
1901), vol.1, 40-69; Costantino Mortati, La Costituzione in Senso Materiale (Milan: Guiffrè, 1940). 
25 Griffith, ‘Political Constitution’, above n.4, 16: ‘the State is yet another metaphysic invented to conceal the reality of 
political power’. Cf. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political G. Schwab trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996), 30-31: ‘Words such as state, republic, society, class, as well as sovereignty, constitutional state, absolutism, 
dictatorship, economic planning, neutral or total state, and so on, are incomprehensible if one does not know exactly 
who is to be affected, combated, refuted, or negated by such a term.’ 
26 See, eg, Thomas Poole, ‘Tilting at Windmills: Truth and Illusion in “The Political Constitution”’ (2007) 70 MLR 250-
77, where neither Robson nor Jennings are mentioned, and Laski referred to only once in a footnote on the impact of 
the First World War (at 263, n.85). In a subsequent paper by Poole, ‘The Elegiac Tradition: Public Law and Memory’ 
[2014] PL 68-84, Jennings is discussed but neither Laski nor Robson mentioned.  
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method. As such it garnered relatively little critical attention,27 for the reason that public 
lawyers had more important practical and political issues to address. Functionalists conceived 
public law as the law of public institutions. But their descriptive method had been shaped by 
the underlying conviction that social progress could only be sustained through the growth in 
the role of public institutions staffed by professionals educated in an ethos of public 
service.28 Yet in the very year that Griffith’s lecture was published, this tenet was seriously 
threatened by the election of a Conservative administration on a manifesto promising to roll 
back the state and restore individual freedom.29  
Through four successive terms, the Conservative government promoted policies of 
privatisation, de-regulation and restructuring the welfare state. In Public Law and Political 
Theory, published in 1992, I argued that these reforms had generated a crisis of conviction 
among adherents to the functionalist method and that was underpinned by a more general 
crisis in the development of the modern administrative regulatory state during the post-war 
period.30 Further, these shifts were leading not only to a loss of faith in the functionalist 
method but also in the dominant tradition of twentieth century public law thought, which I 
labelled conservative normativism. These developments indicated for me why public law 
scholarship was in this ‘curiously unsatisfactory condition’. 31  They accounted for the 
emergence of a different rationalist method, one Griffith had criticised as the resurgence of 
natural law theories and which I labelled ‘liberal normativism’. 
Only in the new millennium did the growing hegemony of liberal normativism lead a 
new generation of public law scholars to present a normatively-infused defence of the British 
constitution constructed on different premises. In doing so, a peculiar thing happened: 
Griffith’s Chorley Lecture was adopted as a palimpsest of the new movement. The 
revisionists adopted the lecture as a symbolic expression of something quite different from 
what Griffith had intended. The expression ‘the political constitution’ signified for Griffith 
an empirical method of studying the constitution of a polity shaped by the interplay of 
political forces. But this was repackaged as an alternative normative theory. Griffith’s orthodox 
functional analysis was converted into what Graham Gee and Grégoire Webber called a 
‘novel account of Britain’s constitutional arrangements’ which ‘laid the foundations for the 
emergence of the idea of the political constitution as a fresh and provocative way of thinking 
and talking about the British constitution’.32 The ‘political constitution’ was transformed into 
																																																								
27 Google scholar records 416 citations to the article: during the first twenty years there were 86 citations and since 
2000, 325 (accessed: 3 November 2017). 
28 See, eg, JAG Griffith, Central Departments and Local Authorities (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), 534: ‘The 
professionalism of local government officers is the greatest single force which enables local authorities to carry out, 
with much efficiency, the considerable tasks entrusted to them. And pride in a profession is a better insurance of high-
class performance than more material interests.’ 
29 Conservative Election Manifesto 1979, Foreword (Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher): ‘No one who has lived in this country 
during the last five years can fail to be aware of how the balance of our society has been increasingly tilted in favour of 
the State at the expense of individual freedom. This election may be the last chance we have to reverse that process, to 
restore the balance of power in favour of the people. It is therefore the most crucial election since the war.’ 
30 See Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory, above n.19, ch.9. For general analyses of crisis of the period see: Jürgen 
Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975); James O’Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St 
Martin’s Press,1973); Robert Bacon & WA Eltis, Britain’s Economic Problem: Too Few Producers (London: Macmillan, 1976); 
Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations. Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1982); SH Beer, Britain Against Itself: The political contradictions of collectivism (London: Faber, 1982); Anthony King, 
‘Overload: problems of governing in the 1970s’ (1975) 23 Political Studies 283-96; James Douglas, ‘The Overloaded Crown’ 
(1976) 6 British Journal of Political Science 483-505; Claus Offe, ‘“Ungovernability”: the renaissance of conservative theories of 
crisis’ in his Contradictions of the Welfare State (London: Hutchinson, 1984), ch.2. 
31 Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory, above n.19, 1. 
32 Graham Gee and Grégoire Webber, ‘What is a Political Constitution?’ (2010) 30 OJLS 273-299 at 277. 
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‘political constitutionalism’ and in this guise was presented as a phenomenon set in 
opposition to something called ‘the legal constitution’. 
This is a strange manoeuvre. It caused my colleague Thomas Poole in 2007 to suggest 
that, far from being the last gasp of a method whose days were numbered, ‘The Political 
Constitution’ was Griffith’s ‘most important and influential work’ and had ‘become a 
founding text of an influential style of public law thinking’ called ‘political 
constitutionalism’.33 But it was equally strange that as a consequence of this manoeuvre 
constitutional analysis was converted into an adversarial contest, a quarrel over ‘the legal’ 
versus ‘the political’ constitution.34 As I noted in 2006, the question ‘is not whether we have 
a legal or political constitution: it is how the idea of law within the political constitution (i.e., 
the constitution of the polity) might best be conceptualized’.35 The formulation ‘legal v. 
political’ was doomed to lead to an entirely fruitless debate.  
 
 
 
V. THE RISE AND FALL OF POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM? 
 
The main advocate of ‘political constitutionalism’ was Adam Tomkins. Concerned with the 
growing influence of the liberal normativist style of public law now re-labelled ‘legal 
constitutionalism’, Tomkins has since the late-1990s been searching for alternative ways of 
expressing the theoretical basis of British constitutional practice.  
His first iteration was a defence of what in 1998 he called the ‘parliamentary 
constitution’,36 subsequently amplified by his suggestion that the British constitution contains 
a ‘bi-polar separation of power … not between legislature, executive, and judiciary, but 
between the Crown and Parliament’. 37  These formulations, however, are thoroughly 
orthodox, being compatible with both the standard narrative of conservative normativism 
expounded by Dicey and his followers and by the functionalist account.38 In 2002, Tomkins 
made a more ambitious claim for the normative authority of what he called the ‘political 
constitution’, 39  and this was extended in 2005 by his advocacy of ‘our republican 
constitution’. 40  It is these later innovations that are of particular relevance to Griffith’s 
account of the political constitution. 
Tomkins’ advocacy of the political constitution in 2002 began by invoking Harlow and 
Rawlings’ red-light/green-light imagery to indicate that public lawyers have become 
																																																								
33 Poole, ‘Tilting at Windmills?’ above n.26, at 250, 251. Poole is not alone in this historical revisionism. See, eg, Paul 
Scott, ‘(Political) constitutions and (political) constitutionalism’ (2013) German LJ 2157-83, at 2162: ‘It is no 
coincidence that the political constitution as a phenomenon was identified by Griffith in part as a response to, among 
others, Ronald Dworkin.’  
34 See Adam Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the Political Constitution’ (2002) 22 OJLS 157-75; Tom R. Hickman, ‘In 
Defence of the Legal Constitution’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto LJ 981-1022 . 
35 Martin Loughlin, ‘Towards a Republican Revival?’ (2006) 26 Oxford J. of Legal Studs 425-37, at 435-6. 
36 Adam Tomkins, The Constitution After Scott: Government Unwrapped (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 266-
75,‘Conclusion: Reforming the Parliamentary Constitution’. 
37 Adam Tomkins, Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 46-47. 
38 See, eg, James Mill, An Essay on Government, [1820] Ernest Barker intro. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1937); John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government [1861] in his Three Essays (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1975), 145-423, esp.211-228; Bagehot, above n3, 151 (‘The whole life of English politics is the action and 
reaction between the Ministry and the Parliament.’); Griffith, ‘The Place of Parliament’, above n.9. 
39 Tomkins, Public Law, above n.37, 18-24. 
40 Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Oxford: Hart, 2005). 
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accustomed to thinking of their subject ‘in terms of competing schools of thought’.41 This 
was unpropitious since this simile, treating judicial review like traffic lights, is incapable of 
providing a robust theoretical foundation of British public law and the fact that it has been 
widely adopted is indicative of contemporary problems.42 Tomkins then explained that the 
British state ‘has been based on a political constitution, but over the past thirty years the 
tradition of the political constitution has come under pressure from the rival theory of legal 
constitutionalism’.43 Tomkins here is evidently using the term ‘the political constitution’ as a 
synonym for a ‘parliamentary constitution’. This leads him to argue that because of the 
growing influence of legal constitutionalism, the alternative of political constitutionalism 
must be defended on normative grounds. A ‘revolution is happening’ he claims: ‘The 
constitution is up for grabs, and it is the judges who are grabbing it’.44 
The problem with Tomkins’ search for an alternative normative account of the British 
constitution is that he converts Griffith’s Chorley Lecture into something it is not, namely, 
‘the most important statement on the political model of constitutionalism’. 45  He then 
advances his account from what he perceives to be deficiencies in Griffith’s presentation of 
that ‘model’. He contends that Griffith’s (so-called) ‘defence of the political constitution’ is 
‘entirely descriptive’ and is deficient because Griffith ‘did not believe the political model of 
accountability to be constitutionally required, still less constitutionally entrenched’.46 
These are, to my mind, errors. Griffith’s account was not ‘entirely’ descriptive; it was 
based on a Comtean belief in continuing social progress. It was neither a ‘defence’ nor a 
‘model’; it was an explanation. And given his views on the nature of the constitution, 
Griffith’s account could never have risen to the level of being ‘constitutionally required’. 
Tomkins seeks to convert Griffith’s functional method into a ‘model’ for the purpose of 
grounding it ‘in theory’ and explaining ‘the norms and values on which the model was 
founded’.47 He perceives this to be required because Griffith’s method, although ‘developed 
by people who were largely progressive in their personal politics, was not founded on 
progressive values. It is functionalist, or descriptive, in nature, rather than normative’.48  
Tomkins’ ambitious aim is to show that the legal constitutionalist account is not just 
distorted; it is ‘unconstitutional’.49 In order to deliver on this ambition he had to demonstrate 
that republicanism offers a better account of the fundamental values underpinning the 
British constitution.50 I have argued elsewhere that he does not achieve that objective.51 This 
cannot be done without a skewed reading of modern political developments, thereby 
engaging in precisely the type of exercise – a Romantic argument of retrogressive progress – 																																																								
41 Tomkins, ‘In Defence’, above n.34, 157. 
42 Although Harlow and Rawlings use it only as a teaching technique, others have elevated it into a theoretical 
framework of public law: Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 3rd edn. 2009). It cannot provide a theoretical foundation of public law because this traffic-light 
imagery conceives law entirely as an instrumental technique. This might work for Griffith, but will not be supported by 
those who reject the functionalist method. 
43 Public Law, 21. 
44 Public Law, 23. 
45 Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution, above n.40, at 36. 
46 Ibid. 38. 
47 Ibid. 40. 
48 Ibid. 39. Tomkins also states: ‘American legal realism reached its height from the 1920s to the 1940s, but its insights 
did not appear to penetrate British public law scholarship until the 1970s … Only at this point did British 
constitutional commentators such as John Griffith start to point out that judicial law-making is just as much a political 
enterprise as is parliamentary law-making’ (ibid. 12). This is a curiously inaccurate statement. Cf. Loughlin, Public Law 
and Political Theory, above n.19, 126-37, 165-76. 
49 Tomkins, ibid. 40. 
50 Ibid 131: ‘the republican values on which our political constitution was founded’. 
51 Loughlin, ‘Towards a Republican Revival?’, above n.35. 
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for which he (rightly) criticises legal constitutionalists. But he also fails to appreciate that 
since republicans accord law a central place in their theories, no republican reading of the 
constitution is possible without embracing some version of the legal constitutionalism he 
criticises. 
Griffith recognised only too well that the evolved parliamentary constitution rests on a 
system of government far removed from the republicanism Tomkins promotes. 52 He was 
suspicious of those who, in the course of describing, eulogised parliamentary practices.53 And 
his account of politics was more sober than the normative conception Tomkins advocates; 
where Tomkins talks of politics as a practice to ‘be celebrated’ and which ‘makes us free’ and 
‘makes us human’, 54  Griffith sees a set of practices generated as a consequence of the 
‘wearisome condition of humanity’.55 Whatever the virtues of Tomkins’ project, there is little 
evidence to support it in Griffith’s work. 
By 2010, Gee and Webber were telling us that it ‘is commonplace … for textbooks and 
articles to juxtapose the idea of a political constitution with that of a legal constitution’.56 If 
that is correct, it reveals the impoverishment of public law thought. Significantly, it was not 
long after this that Tomkins entirely resiled from his own argument. Writing in 2013, he 
suggested that the ‘model of the political constitution has frequently been contrasted with 
that of the legal constitution’ and the relationship between the two ‘has typically been 
presented as … competing models … doing battle not just for primacy but, it seems, for 
exclusivity’.57 He would know because these are his own declarations. He then baldly asserts 
that such claims are now ‘outdated’ and should be replaced by ‘the revised view’, one that 
conceives the British constitution as a ‘mixed constitution’ of ‘politics and law’.58  
‘If we are to understand the contemporary British constitution’, Tomkins declares, ‘we 
must understand both its political and its legal dimensions’ and ‘[a]ny account of the 
constitution that presented only one of these aspects would necessarily fail’.59 ‘I do not want 
to go back to the political constitution’, he concludes, since the ‘mixed constitution is 
better’.60 This is quite a retreat. It leaves a series of puzzles unresolved. What remains of his 
republican project? What remains of his argument that the British have a bi-polar 
constitution in which ‘the courts are, in some sense, part of, or dependent on, the Crown, 
and are not independent of it’?61 Does he continue to maintain that the practice of politics 
‘makes us free’ and ‘makes us human’? According to what criteria does he now think the 
‘mixed constitution’ is ‘better’? Is his latest pronouncement descriptive or normative? And to 
what extent does this signal his return to the orthodox view of the British constitution as a 
‘parliamentary constitution’? 
 																																																								
52 Griffith, ‘Place of Parliament, Pt.I’, above n.9, at 279: ‘It may be that the emergence of responsible and 
representative government in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries rests on the Revolution of 1688; but it is 
ludicrous to ignore this emergence and to suggest that political developments in the twentieth century are set against 
the same backcloth as those of the seventeenth century’. 
53 Griffith, ibid. 279: ‘We are reluctant to admit in public that it [parliamentary democracy] has any shortcomings in its 
present form. When we compare it to other forms of government we become Blackstonian in our adulation’. 
54 Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the Political Constitution’, above n.34, 172. 
55 Griffith, ‘Political Constitution’, above n.4, 3. 
56 Gee and Webber, above n.32, 273. 
57 Adam Tomkins, ‘What’s Left of the Political Constitution?’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 2275-92, at 2275. 
58 Ibid. 2275-6. 
59 Ibid. 2276. 
60 Ibid. 2292. 
61 Tomkins, above n.37, 54-5. 
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VI. POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM RECONSTITUTED 
 
Tomkins is not the only scholar who has used Griffith’s lecture as the basis for an alternative 
normative account of the British constitution. A second strand espouses ‘political 
constitutionalism’ but does not tie it to a claim about republicanism. This strand has been 
most coherently developed by Graham Gee. In 2008, Gee presented what he calls variously a 
‘defence and partial reconstruction’ and a ‘reconstruction and partial defence’ of Griffith’s 
‘political constitutionalism’. 62 In this article, Gee criticises what he rightly perceives as a 
‘tendency to caricature Griffith’s work’, but then proceeds to call Griffith ‘the archetypal 
political constitutionalist’, thereby contributing to that tendency.63 Gee claims that ‘while 30 
years ago unnerving in their unorthodoxy’, Griffith’s ideas can today appear ‘clichéd’.64 But is 
the opposite not actually the case? Thirty years ago they were understood as an orthodox 
statement of the functional method whereas today, through misrepresentation, they are 
repackaged in a clichéd form. 
Gee’s main objective is to reconstruct the ‘dissenting tradition’ of functionalism as 
‘political constitutionalism’. 65  Claiming that Griffith has an ‘underdeveloped account of 
politics’ that needs reconstruction, he begins by criticising Poole’s claim that Griffith’s 
comment that ‘the constitution is what happens’ results in ‘stripping the entity it describes of 
any real meaning’. 66  Gee is correct, though it is surprising how many political 
constitutionalists have been entranced by the so-called ‘Griffith aphorism’. After all, it is 
merely a pithy formulation of what has been the orthodox understanding of the British 
constitution over the last 250 years. 67 
Yet the main aim of Gee’s article is to present an alternative to Tomkin’s republicanism. 
He finds this in Michael Oakeshott’s account of politics.68 Gee claims there is an ‘obvious 
irony’ in making a connection between Griffith and Oakeshott’s views of political activity, 
but this is not self-evident.69 Both believed that politics is rooted in practice, that is, in 																																																								
62 Graham Gee, ‘The political constitutionalism of JAG Griffith’ (2008) 28 Legal Studies 20-45, at 20, 22. 
63 Ibid. 21. 
64 Ibid. 22. 
65 Ibid. 21-2. 
66 Poole, above n.26, 275; Gee, ibid. 32-37. 
67 For evidence that Griffith’s claim that the constitution is ‘what happens’, which he first stated in 1963, is in no sense 
novel or unorthodox see, eg, Bagehot, above n.3, 267: ‘There is a great difficulty in the way of a writer who attempts to 
sketch a living Constitution … The difficulty is that the object is in constant change. …[A] contemporary writer who 
tries to paint what is before him is puzzled and perplexed: what he sees is changing daily’; AV Dicey, Introduction to the 
Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan, 8th edn 1915), 85-86: ‘The constitution, he [Tocqueville] seems to 
have thought, was changeable because it was not reduced to a written or statutory form. It is far nearer the truth to 
assert that the constitution has never been reduced to a written or statutory form because each and every part of it is 
changeable at the will of Parliament’; W. Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1st 
edn. 1936), xii: ‘the British constitution is changing so rapidly that it is difficult to keep pace with it’; JP Mackintosh, 
The British Cabinet (London: Stevens, 1962), 534:  ‘In fact, all of our institutions change as British society and world 
conditions alter.’; Graeme C. Moodie, The Government of Great Britain (London: Methuen, 1964), 16: ‘the British constitution is 
thus a continuously changing blend of the ancient and modern’. Are any of these views new? See the (anonymous) review of 
Cato, An Essay on the Constitution of England (1765): ‘There is scarce a word so frequently used, and so little understood as the 
word Constitution. If nothing more is intended by it than to express the several component parts of Government ... all men 
must agree about its signification: but if we take into the idea the several powers vested in those orders, it will then be 
difficult to define it. Indeed taking the word to include the latter idea, it does not admit of a precise and permanent 
definition; for as those powers are liable to fluctuate from a variety of adventitious circumstances, which make the political 
scale at different times preponderate in favour of different parties, what is called the Constitution must necessarily vary with 
every accidental change.’ (Monthly Review, or Literary Journal, Jan. 1765: 72 British Periodicals 59). 
68 Gee, above n.62, 23. 
69 Ibid. 38. 
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experience; both believed that theories of politics are false in that they are rationalisations of 
experience; and both saw politics as an expression of what we do, not what ought to be 
done.70 But - and this is critical - the association between the two is more contentious if one 
conflates similarities in their view of the nature of political activity with similarities in their 
political views. Gee is careful not to conflate their political views, helpfully accentuating 
some of the traditional aspects of Griffith’s socialist orientation. But the analogy is an 
uncomfortable one and the question is: what is to be gained by this comparison? 
I have an answer which requires me to return to the framework of Public Law and 
Political Theory. In arguing that public law discourse was bifurcated, I maintained that between 
the two basic styles of normativism and functionalism there is no underlying agreement on 
the boundaries and contours of the subject. A scholar’s argument is always situated within a 
political tradition. I suggested that the dominant tradition has been a conservative variant of 
normativism. This adheres to the common law method with its distaste for system and finds 
its political expression in the unwritten British constitution. I explained that this tradition, 
whose philosophical foundations are best expressed by Oakeshott, progressively loses its 
authority in the twentieth century because of its inability to respond constructively to the rise 
of democracy and the growth in government.  
For much of the twentieth century, the intellectual alternative to conservative 
normativism came from a functional method which embraced democracy and the 
administrative state while advocating new institutional arrangements to respond effectively to 
the modern order of government. In this worldview, the common law was perceived as a 
core element of the problem of adaptation, badly in need of replacement by a rational system 
of administrative law. But just as conservative normativism had failed to respond to modern 
developments, functionalism was found wanting when, conceiving law as a means to an end, 
it was felt to possess no critical legal resources to address the political issues arising when 
governmental powers were used to retrench. It was the crises within these two traditions that 
provided the conceptual space for a liberal variant of normativism to emerge. In these 
circumstances law was transformed from precedent or instrument into a general moral 
concept requiring fidelity not just to rules but to the principles of fairness and justice that 
legal rules presuppose.71 
Griffith’s lecture marks the last gasp of functionalism. The functionalist style had been 
underwritten by Fabian socialist principles, with the continuous growth of the public sector a 
sign of continuing social progress. By the end of the 1960s however, Griffith was expressing 
his sense of disillusion about the movement. Aspects of a provocatively-titled essay of his 
from that period support the case for radical constitutional reform, though reform of a 
different nature from Hailsham’s conservative and Scarman’s liberal advocacy during the 
1970s. In ‘Why we need a Revolution’, Griffith argues that the ‘intractability of the present 
constitutional set-up, the reason why nothing short of a revolution will do the trick is 
evidenced … [by lack of radical ideas in various proposals for reforms]’.72 But his realism or 
pessimism soon comes to the fore: ‘This demand is unlikely to be met because there are no 																																																								
70 Their views are outlined in Public Law and Political Theory, above n.19, 64-83, 197-201. Evidence that Griffith could be 
situated in this way of thinking about political practice can be gleaned from his admiration for the lectures of the 
former Conservative MP, Leo Amery: LS Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution (London: Oxford University Press, 1948). 
See Griffith, ‘Delegated Legislation’, above n.7, 1081 (n5): ‘I take this opportunity of acknowledging my debt to this 
brilliant analysis’.  
71 Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory, above n.19, 230-40. 
72 JAG Griffith, ‘Why we need a Revolution’ in Bernard Crick and William A. Robson (eds) Protest and Discontent 
(London: Pelican, 1970), 25-36, at 31. 
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ways of meeting it within the political and economic system’.73 Consequently, revolution is 
necessary ‘as the only alternative now that reformism has not simply failed but has been 
shown to be incapable of success’.74 This unspecific appeal, it should be emphasised, was 
born of disappointment: ‘We are not struggling towards the summit, impeded by those who 
wish to prevent us from reaching it’ but simply ‘struggling to avoid slipping further down the 
slope’.75 He concludes somewhat implausibly by claiming that ‘I have a disposition to be 
utopian’.76 There is little evidence of this in his other writing, nor a decade later in his 
Chorley lecture. And for this reason, I would suggest that he is the last of the Fabian public 
lawyers.77 
This has been a rather circuitous way of coming to my main point about the post-
republican reconstitution of so-called ‘political constitutionalism’. Far from being a 
continuation of Griffith’s functionalist method, political constitutionalism is an attempt to 
revive the conservative normativist project in the twenty-first century. Contrary to Gee’s 
claim to be reconstructing the dissenting tradition of functionalism as political 
constitutionalism, the movement promoted by Tomkins in his post-republican phase, and by 
Gee, Webber and others seeks to reconstitute and restore the authority of conservative 
normativism. Having lost the support of the judiciary now that the traditional guardians of 
conservative normativist values have been won over to liberal normativism, conservative 
normativists, assuming the mantle of political constitutionalists, now seek to bolster the 
authority of Parliament. 
In this endeavour, they have received support from some powerful quarters. In a series 
of well-publicised public lectures, for example, Lord Sumption has warned that the biggest 
problem facing the judiciary today is that of preserving the traditional boundary between 
politics and law.78 The political constitutionalists have now coalesced as a group around a 
‘Judicial Power Project’ funded by the Conservative-orientated think tank, Policy Exchange.79 
They may well be raising important issues for discussion, but my point is that their 
conceptions of law and constitution and their political orientation diverge in important 
respects from Griffith’s arguments in ‘The Political Constitution’. The similarities are 
superficial, the differences profound. Those differences are highlighted by Griffith in one of 
his last essays in which he sums up his concerns about contemporary trends: 
 
The mistake is to take individual rights seriously and social inequalities lightly. Today 
we live in a period of economic and political decline and of institutional collapse. 
Because of this there is much talk of constitutional reform. But it is directed not to 
																																																								
73 Ibid. 35. 
74 Ibid. 36. 
75 Ibid. 36. 
76 Ibid. 36. 
77 Cf. Griffith, ‘Justice and Administrative Law Revisited’, above n.20, at 201: ‘this has been his [Robson’s] manner and 
style throughout, as it was with so many of his contemporaries. But like them – especially the Webbs – strong political 
feeling kept breaking through, not necessarily or even often to damage the objectivity of the analysis but to provide its 
motive and to inform it. He is the last of the Fabians.’ 
78 See Jonathan Sumption QC, ‘Judicial and Political Decision-Making: The Uncertain Boundary’ FA Mann Lecture, 
2011; Lord Sumption, ‘Foreign Affairs in the English Courts since 9/11’, lecture at the LSE, 14 May 2012; Lord 
Sumption, ‘The Limits of Law’ in NW Barber, Richard Ekins and Paul Yowell (eds), Lord Sumption and the Limits of the 
Law (Oxford: Hart, 2016), ch.2. See further Martin Loughlin, ‘Sumption’s Assumptions’ in Barber et al ibid., ch.3. 
79 The Wikipedia entry for Policy Exchange states it is ‘the largest, but also the most influential think tank on the right’ 
(source: Daily Telegraph), and is ‘a neo liberal lobby group funded by dark money’ (The Guardian). Graham Gee is a 
prominent member, acting as the Project’s website editor and contributing several blogposts. Richard Ekins, Oxford 
University, is the Project Director. 
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the betterment of the majority of the population but to the strengthening of the 
privileges of the few.80  
 
These contemporary controversies have at least two dimensions: institutional relations and 
political impact. Griffith’s views on public law harnessed law as a means to the end of 
promoting equality and justice. He was sceptical about the rise of judicial power, but this 
scepticism was situated within a broader institutional analysis that gets little attention from 
today’s political constitutionalists. And if they do not retain that link between means and 
ends, they remain far removed from Griffith’s functionalist account of the political 
constitution.  
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
My objective in revisiting Griffith’s Chorley Lecture has been to suggest that its meaning and 
significance must be situated within its intellectual and political context. ‘The Political 
Constitution’, far from presenting a novel analysis, was a critical account of contemporary 
constitutional ideas from the perspective of a well-established functionalist public law 
method. It has been adopted by a new generation of public law scholars as a call-to-arms 
against the hegemony of liberal normativism/legal constitutionalism but this has entailed 
significantly distorting his argument. Griffith might not have been unhappy about that: better 
to be misread for justified political purposes, he could well have said, than ignored because 
of the strictures of an austere juristic method. But if the discipline is to develop, we must 
acknowledge the nature of the manoeuvres being made in these reconstructions of Griffith’s 
arguments. The value of historical knowledge after all is not that it tells us how to succeed. 
Rather, it tells us what we have become. 
 
																																																								
80 Griffith, ‘Judges and Constitution’, above n.24, at 310. 
